University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1995

Reply to Comments on the Patentability of Certain Inventions
Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences
Rebecca S. Eisenberg

University of Michigan Law School, rse@umich.edu

Robert P. Merges

University of California at Berkeley School of Law

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1758

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Intellectual Property Law
Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eisenberg, Rebecca S., co-author. "Reply to Comments on the Patentability of Certain Inventions
Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences." R. P. Merges, co-author. AIPLA Q. J. 23, no.
1 (1995): 61-3.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

AIPLA
VOLUME 23, NUMBER 1

QUARTERLy JOURNAL
PAGE 61

WINTER 1995

REPLY TO COMMENTS ON THE PATENT ABILITY OF
CERTAIN INVENTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIAL cDNA SEQUENCES
Rebecca S. Eisenberg
Robert P. Merges·

A brief reply is in order to clarify our position on the patenting of

research tools.

We stand by the statement that "there are reasons to be wary of

patents on research tools,"1 but that statement should not be understood as
a broad condemnation of patents on research tools in all contexts. Indeed,

immediately after the cited language our opinion letter acknowledges that

withholding patent protection from research tools could undermine private

incentives to develop research tools and to make them available to
investigators or lead to greater reliance on trade secrecy.

Unlike the

government, which purports to pursue patent rights for the purpose of

facilitating technology transfer, private firms pursue patents in order to earn

a return on investments in R&D that would otherwise be unprofitable. Thus,
even in cases where patents do nothing to facilitate technology transfer,

private firms may invoke justifications for their claims of proprietary rights
in the results of research that they have paid for. These justifications have

considerably less force when applied to the results of research paid for by

the government.

· ©
1

1996 Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Robert P. Merges.

Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the

Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial
cDNA Sequences,

23 AIPLA Q.J. l, 19 (1995).

AIPLAQ.J.

62

Vol. 23: 61

Nonetheless, we disagree with Dr. Chambers' statement that

"[p]atents that cover research tools are no more qangerous than patents that
cover any other aspect of human endeavor."2
The primary difficulty with patents or other proprietary rights in
research tools is that they can be used to restrict access to discoveries that are

likely to have the greatest social value if they are widely disseminated to
researchers who are taking different approaches to different problems. True

believers

in

intellectual

property

might

argue

that

if

widespread

dissemination is socially valuable, patent owners will be well motivated to

disseminate their research tools widely through licensing. Indeed, in many

cases, owners of patents on research tools will perceive researchers as
customers for their patented products. For example, owners of patents on

research reagents will generally maximize their profits by making the
reagents widely available to anyone who wants them in anonymous market
transactions.

Even when researchers are not ordinary consumers of a

patented invention, patent owners may welcome the use of their inventions

by researchers, perhaps hoping that their research efforts will enhance the
value of the patented inventions.
But there .�re reasons to fear that we can not always rely on a market

for licenses to achieve optimal di�semination of research tools.

For one

thing, not all research tools are of a character that permits widespread

distribution in an anonymous market. Sometimes face-to-face negotiations

will be necessary in order to secure a license and, in these cases, researchers

may be called upon to disclose what it is that they plan to do with the

patented research tools before they are ready to do so. Researchers who do
not want to disclose the directions of their research in its early stages may be
reluctant to tip their hand by requesting a license.
Moreover, a significant research project might require access to a

great many research tools. If each of these tools requires a separate license
and royalty payment, the costs and administrative burden could mount

quickly. This could be a particularly unattractive outcome for an institution

such as NIH that may find itself in the position of royalty-payor in its role as

research sponsor at least as often as it finds itself in the position of royaltee-
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payee in its role as patent holder. More troubling still, owners of patents on
research tools may find it more lucrative to license their patents on an

exclusive basis rather than on a non-exclusive basis, a strategy that could

choke other research efforts before they get off the ground.

Dr. Chambers suggests that the downside risk of patents on research
tools is minimal because the courts have the equitable power to withhold

injunctive relief against researchers. But in spite of the equitable character
of injunctive relief, there is only a small handful of cases in which courts
have withheld permanent injunctions once patent infringement is proven,

and researchers would be foolish to count on getting such a break. And even
if at the end of the day researchers are able to beat the odds and avoid

injunctive relief, the prospect of a damage remedy alone can be expected to

deter socially productive uses of research tools.

We concede that proprietary rights may enhance incentives to

develop further research tools in the private sector, and it may be that on

balance the research enterprise will benefit more from the development of

these new tools than it loses by allowing those who develop research tools

to restrict access to them. Surely it is better to have research tools available
on a restricted basis than it is to have them entirely unavailable because they
don't exist. But this argument is only persuasive to the extent that, in the

absence of patents, research tools would not be developed.

When the government is picking up the tab, it may be better still to

have research tools freely available in the public domain. Government is

uniquely situated to enrich the public domain, a fact that we should not lose

sight of in the prevailing climate of enthusiasm for private appropriation of
government-sponsored research discoveries.
We do not urge these considerations upon the PTO in

its

determinations of what is patentable, but we believe they are appropriate
considerations for a public institution such as NIH to weigh in deciding

when it should pursue patents on its own discoveries, and when it would be
wiser to dedicate those discoveries to the public domain.

